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SPRING 1964]
PROXIMATE CAUSE AND THE PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME
COURT: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS IN REVIEW
I.
INTRODUCTION
It is hornbook law that a plaintiff seeking to recover damages for
his injuries must prove not only the negligence of the defendant, but also
that the latter's substandard conduct was the "proximate cause" of his
injuries. This term, coined by Lord Bacon in his Maxims of the Law,'
has been the object of extensive discussion on the part of judges and legal
writers. 2 The purpose of this comment is not to define a priori "proximate
cause" in the abstract, but to investigate the cases decided by the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania in the past twenty-five years with the hope that
some basic principles and a sense of direction can be gleaned therefrom,
in order to extrapolate a functioning model of the proximate cause factor
in its workaday setting.
II.
IN GENERAL
Pennsylvania subscribes to the fault theory of recovery in negligence
cases. By this doctrine a person is held accountable for the damages his
conduct has wrought upon another when he has acted below the standard
imposed by the law on a fictional reasonably prudent man.3 But, since
the consequences of an act are virtually infinite in the physical sense, there
is a general feeling that to impose liability for all the harm an actor's
conduct has in fact caused would be to harness him with a crushing financial
burden. 4 To achieve a balance between making the actor responsible for
the harm occasioned by his default and not placing an insurmountable onus
upon him at the same time, the courts have developed the principle that a
negligent actor is responsible only for the harm proximately caused by his
activity. The use of this term is unfortunate, however, because linguistically
it implies a requisite of nearness in time and space between the injury and
its cause ;5 this literal interpretation has in practice been almost completely
1. In jure non remota causa, sed proxina, spectatur. [In law the near cause is
looked to, and not the remote one.] It were infinite for the law to judge the cause of
causes and their impulsions one of another; therefore it contenteth itself with. the
immediate cause, and judgeth of acts by that, without looking to any further degree.
BAC. MAX., reg. I., quoted in BROom, LEGAL, MAXIJMS (8th Am. ed. 1887).
2. For a sampling of the multitude of articles and comments on this subject see
2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS, 1109 n.4 (1956). See generally, GREEN, RATIONALE OF
PROXIMATE CAUSE (1927) ; HARPER & JAMEs, op. cit. supra 1108-61 ; KEETON, LEGAL
CAUSE 1- THE LAW OF TORTS (1963) ; PROSSER, TORTS 252-82 (2d ed. 1955).
3. Lavelle v. Grace, 348 Pa. 175, 34 A.2d 498 (1943).
4. PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 218-19.
5. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania originally took this position in Pennsyl-
vania R.R. v. Kerr, 62 Pa. 353 (1870), but abandoned it in the case of Pennsylvania
R.R. v. Hope, 80 Pa. 373 (1876).
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disregarded.6 In order to avoid linguistic detours into the realm of Platonic
ideals, therefore, the best approach may be not to define the concept in terms
of what it is, but to examine what the courts do with it functionally, and that
is to set the outside limit on liability for negligence which has previously
been found to exist, and which in fact caused the injury complained of.
III.
CAUSE IN FACT
At the outset, before the issue of proximate or legal cause arises,
defendant's negligent conduct must be shown to have been an actual cause
of plaintiff's harm. 7 Usually the plaintiff establishes a cause in fact relation-
ship by presenting facts which indicate a negative answer to the following
question: would the injury suffered have been sustained "but for" the
defendant's negligence? Of course, how much evidence plaintiff must
produce before a jury may reasonably find that defendant's conduct was
the actual cause of plaintiff's injury is a question of law ;" whether it was
the actual cause, assuming there is sufficient evidence, is a question of fact.9
Even so, it may sometimes happen that appellate courts reverse findings
of the fact of actual causation by juries, not by questioning the sufficiency
of the evidence of actual cause, but by treating the question as one of
proximate rather than actual causation. And it is axiomatic that proximate
cause is a question of law.
In a line of cases of which Wisniewski v. Chestnut Hill Hosp.'0 is
typical, the defendant's alleged negligence was the violation of a statute or
ordinance designed to set a standard of care for the protection of others.
In that case plaintiff tripped as she started down a stairway in defendant's
hospital. She grabbed for the handrail on the left, but missed it and then
attempted to break her fall by catching hold of the handrail on the right side.
There was none, and in this respect defendant had violated the building
code. There was evidence that plaintiff had looked down and had seen the
stairs before commencing her descent, but had misjudged the distance and
had overstepped. The court held that the absence of the handrail was
6. PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 254.
7. E.g., Simon v. Hudson Coal Co., 350 Pa. 82, 38 A.2d 259 (1944). There a
child fell into a watercourse and was drowned. Defendant had pumped water into the
stream, but had not given notice of its intention to the lower riparian owners. On
appeal from a non-suit, the court was of the opinion that even if the defendant could
be assumed to be negligent, the fact that the accident would have taken place anyway
was sufficient to show no causal connection. Accord, Washburn v. Brunswick Hotel.
Inc., 366 Pa. 463, 77 A.2d 357 (1951) (no causal connection between failure to give
stop signal and ensuing accident); Harrison v. City of Pittsburgh, 353 Pa. 22, 44
A.2d 273 (1945) (alternative holding) (elevated manhole cover not causative factor
where plaintiff slipped on, rather than tripped over it); see also McIntyre v. Pope,
326 Pa. 172, 191 Atl. 607 (1937), where plaintiff was denied recovery for injuries
sustained in an accident on the basis of his contributory negligence. This case was
later interpreted in McClelland v. Copeland, 355 Pa. 405, 50 A.2d 221 (1947), to mean
that there must be a causal relation between contributory negligence and the accident.
8. Eckley v. Seese, 382 Pa. 425, 115 A.2d 227 (1955).
9. Fries v. Ritter, 381 Pa. 470, 112 A.2d 189 (1955).
10. 403 Pa. 610, 170 A.2d 595 (1961).
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not the proximate cause of plaintiff's fall and that the violation of an
ordinance was not a ground for recovery unless it was the proximate cause
of the injury." In passing, the court discounted as being without merit the
plaintiff's contention that the dimly lit condition of the stairway was the
cause of her fall, a finding apparently proper in view of the evidence that
she had looked and seen the stairs before starting down. A similar finding
in the case of Loeb v. Allegheny County12 cannot be so justified. There
the plaintiff slipped on the stairs in defendant's courthouse and claimed
that the lack of a side light in the stairway was the cause of his mishap.
The court assumed that the light was out for a sufficient time to require
sending the question of negligence to the jury, but then concluded that
the proximate cause of the fall was the plaintiff's act of slipping on a liquid
spot on the step. A questionable result indeed, but even more questionable
is the use in this type of case of the term "proximate cause" when what
is apparently meant is that the aspect of. defendant's total conduct which is
said to be negligent was not the cause in fact of the plaintiff's injury.
Indeed, in both cases the real question seems to have been: could a
reasonable jury have found that the absence of the right hand rail or the
absence of a light was the actual cause of the fall ?13
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, 14 the plaintiff can
generally sustain his burden of proof on the causation aspect of his case
with the use of the "but for" test. There is one instance, however, when
the formula leads to an unwarranted result, and that occurs where defen-
dant's negligence combines with another force which alone would be
sufficient to bring about the damage to plaintiff. If the "but for" question
is asked, the affirmative answer would relieve the defendant from liability
because plaintiff's injury would have been sustained regardless of defen-
dant's wrongful conduct. In such cases a different test is applied, and its
stated purpose is to ascertain whether the negligence of the defendant was
11. Accord, Kaplan v. Kaplan, 404 Pa. 147, 171 A.2d 166 (1961) (plaintiff struck
by trolley as he walked from behind illegally parked truck); Klimczak v. 7-Up
Bottling Co., 385 Pa. 287, 122 A.2d 707 (1956) (plaintiff was crushed between his
vehicle and illegally parked truck) ; Ferne v. Chadderton, 363 Pa. 191, 69 A.2d 104(1949) (whether failure to put out flares was proximate cause of ensuing accident
was found to be a question for the jury) ; Ennis v. Atkin, 354 Pa. 165, 47 A.2d 217(1946) (parking too close to fire hydrant not legal cause of death resulting from
collision) ; Landis v. Conestoga Transp. Co., 349 Pa. 97, 36 A.2d 465 (1944) (whether
speed violation was proximate cause of injury was found to be a jury question);
Hutchinson v. Follmer Trucking Co., 333 Pa. 424, 5 A.2d 182 (1939) (plaintiff must
prove that the absence of rear identification light was the proximate cause of an
accident) ; Miller v. Gutherie, 325 Pa.' 495, 191 Atl. 61 (1937) ("semble") (plaintiff
struck by truck which had passed the barricade marking detour) ; see also Little v.
Straw, 326 Pa. 577, 192 Atl. 894 (1937), where the court indicated that to deny
plaintiff his right of recovery it must be shown that the absence of headlights on
which his contributory negligence was based was a proximate or efficient cause of the
accident. See McIntyre v. Pope, 326 Pa. 172, 191 At. 607 (1937).
12. 394 Pa. 433, 147 A.2d 336 (1959).
13. Compare New York Central R.R. v. Grimstad, 264 Fed. 334 (2d Cir. 1920),
with Reynolds v. Texas & Pacific Ry., 37 La. Ann. 694 (Sup. Ct. 1885). Pennsylvania
would appear to follow the requirement of the Grimstad case that the plaintiff should
rule out the likelihood that other possible causes were responsible for his injury.
But see Smith v. Bell Tel. Co., 397 Pa. 134, 153 A.2d 477 (1959).
14. See notes 7 & 10 and accompanying text.
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a "substantial factor" in bringing about harm to the plaintiff. 15 If this is
found to be the case, then liability attaches regardless of the fact that
the concurring cause was an act of God over which defendant had no
control.16 Here too the court has spoken in terms of proximate cause when
it seems clear that what was intended was causation in fact.
IV.
NATURAL AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES
Once negligence and causal connection have been established, the
court is faced with the problem of determining proximate or legal cause.
The issue is whether the negligence of the defendant occupies such a
relation to the harm suffered by plaintiff as to require that defendant be
visited with legal responsibility for the result. If the answer is affirmative,
then his negligence is termed a proximate or legal cause; if the answer
is negative, then his conduct is said to be merely a remote factor in bringing
about the injury. The question itself is one of policy for the court to answer
as a matter of law,17 and its final determination will depend on which of
several views on the extent of liability the court chooses to accept.
One view is that a defendant is liable only for the natural and probable
consequences of his wrongful conduct. This test starts with the result and
questions whether, under the surrounding circumstances of the case, it was
such a consequence as might and ought to have been foreseen by the
defendant as likely to flow from his negligent act.' 8 Thus, foresight serves
a dual purpose. It initially enters into the determination of whether any
harm of a general character was foreseeable with respect to plaintiff,
thereby imposing upon defendant the duty to act accordingly. After a duty
and the breach thereof has been established foresight again enters to test
the extent to which defendant will be held accountable for his wrongful
act. Despite language to the contrary, 19 the foreseeability test was in use
in Pennsylvania at the beginning of the period under investigation.
The case of Irwin Say. & Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R. 20 decided
in 1944, was a wrongful death action arising from the drowning of four
children who had fallen through ice which had formed on a pond created
by backed up water from a blocked culvert. There was evidence presented
that defendant's employees had knowledge that children were in the habit
15. For a list of the factors taken into consideration when ascertaining what is
a substantial factor see RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 433 (1948 Supp.).
16. Carlson v. A.&P. Corrugated Box Corp., 364 Pa. 216, 72 A.2d 290 (1950).
17. See PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 281-82.
18. Fuller v. Palazzolo, 329 Pa. 93, 197 Atl. 225 (1938).
19. Shipley v. Pittsburgh, 321 Pa. 494, 184 Atl. 671 (1936). The suit was against
the city of Pittsburgh growing out of an alleged failure of construction and mainte-
nance of a guard rail on a bridge from which the driver of a motor vehicle and his
guest fell to their injury. The court held that the city was required to keep its bridges
in reasonably safe condition for public travel, and having failed to do so it was liable.
The question of foreseeability would have no application on the issue of proximate
cause. Accord, Quigley v. Delaware & H. Canal Co., 142 Pa. 388, 21 Atl. 827 (1891).
20. 349 Pa. 278, 37 A.2d 432 (1944).
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of playing around and upon the pond. The defendant admitted the negli-
gence of its servants in not clearing the debris from the culvert, but
contended that the children's death was not the natural and probable con-
sequence of its negligence. The court agreed, and while recognizing the
fact that the defendant might successfully have argued that it owed no
duty to the children and was therefore not negligent toward them, chose
to base its decision on the lack of proximate cause. The position of the
court was that it would be too much to suppose that a reasonable man
could have anticipated that the children would run upon the ice to retrieve
a kite which had become entangled in a tree near the center of the pond,
and that the ice would break causing the tragedy which followed. The
majority was of the opinion that the actions-of the children themselves in
going out on the ice was the proximate cause of the misfortune. This
position seems untenable, since if there was negligence as admitted by
defendant then the sortie onto the ice would appear to be clearly within
the risk which flowed from the negligence. Chief Judge Maxey quite
properly took his brethren of the majority to task for holding that the
exact nature of the occurrence must be foreseeable. 2 ' He saw the issue
as whether defendant could have reasonably anticipated that some child
or children would meet with either serious injury or death while playing
around this pond created by the railroad's neglect. He thought the jury
fully justified in finding that the defendant should have anticipated the
misfortune which could easily have been prevented by the expenditure of
a trifling sum of money.
Time has proved Judge Maxey's dissent to be prophetic for within
two years a series of cases commenced to impose inroads upon the Ir-ain
decision which ultimately led to its repudiation.22  In arriving at this
21. Id. at 290, 37 A.2d at 437. In the English case of Hughes v. Lord Advocate.[1963] 1 All E.R. 705, a minor plaintiff was injured when he fell into an open man-
hole left unattended by post office workmen. A number of paraffin warning lamps
had been placed around the outside of a tent erected over the hole, and the plaintiff
knocked one of these into the pit while playing in and around the temporary structure.
The leaking paraffin created a vapor which exploded and caused the plaintiff's fall.
On appeal from a denial of recovery, the House of Lords recognized the foreseeable
danger created by the workmen in that the plaintiff may fall into the hole, or receive
burns from the lamps or both. The uniqueness of the actual occurrence led Lord
Pearce to remark: "In the case of an allurement to children it is particularly hard to
foresee the exact shape of the disaster that will arise .... Did the explosion create
an accident and damage of a different type from the misadventure and damage that
could be foreseen? In my judgment it did not." Id. at 715.
22. Hawkins v. Mack, 364 Pa. 417, 72 A.2d 268 (1950). Deceased was run over
by defendant's truck. Immediately after the accident the footbrake of the truck was
found to be defective. After stating that the jury was warranted in finding that the
accident was caused by inattentiveness or poor brakes, or both, the court cited sec-
tion 435 of the Restatement of Torts and the Shipley case as controlling. In Straight
v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 354 Pa. 391, 47 A.2d 605 (1946), the deceased was found
lying face down in an elevator which he was repairing and which was below the floor
level at the time. On top of him was a radiator which had been in close proximity
to the elevator shaft. Finding a duty owed to deceased because the radiator constituted
a hidden menace which the defendant was obligated either to make safe or disclose,
the court concluded that liability attached. This was so regardless of whether the
defendant, in creating the dangerous situation, may not have foreseen the exact manner
in which deceased would be injured. The earlier case of Quigley v. Delaware & H.
Canal Co., 142 Pa. 388, 21 Atl. 827 (1891), was cited to the effect that the defendant
COMMENTS
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repudiation the court relied heavily on the Restatement of Torts, section
43523 which states in substance that once it is shown that the defendant's
negligence was a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, it is of no
moment that he neither foresaw the extent of the harm, nor the manner
in which it occurred. In 1951 the death knell for the Irwin rationale
sounded loudly in the case of Dahlstrom v. Shrum.2 4 Plaintiff sustained
injuries when the body of a person struck by defendant's car was thrown
against her. Both plaintiff and deceased had alighted from a bus and were
walking from behind it at the time defendant, coming from the opposite
direction, passed the Vehicle. The road was not well lighted and defendant
testified that he was unaware of the nature of the vehicle he was passing.
The court held that plaintiff was outside the ambit of the risk so that
even if a duty could be found to exist with respect to the deceas6d who
had passed from behind the bus, none existed as to the plaintiff since the
defendant could not foresee (in the negligence sense) that an object he
would hit would be thrown against her. 25 Thus, having decided the case
on the basis of defendant's lack of duty, the court went on to clear up
the confused state of the law which existed because it had never expressly
overruled Irwin and the cases cited therein. The court placed itself in
accord with the doctrine that foreseeability has no place in the consideration
of proximate or legal cause however indispensable it may be when the
question of legal duty is at issue.
A caveat should be made at this point. While Dahlstrom, section 435
of the Restatement of Torts and subsequent cases2" have abrogated the
use of foresight on the issue of proximate cause, that repudiation applies
only when the manner of occurrence of the accident or the extent of the
injuries is under consideration. 27 Foreseeability continues to enter the
would be liable for what in the nature of events occurred as a consequence of its
negligence, although in advance the actual result may have seemed improbable. See
also Luckenbaugh v. Haughawout, 353 Pa. 528, 46 A.2d 163 (1946) (by implication).
23. This section has since been amended so that the language referred to in these
cases is presently found in RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 435(1) (1948 Supp.).
24. 368 Pa. 423, 84 A.2d 289 (1951).
25. It is interesting to note that a similar fact situation in the case of Wood v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 177 Pa. 306, 35 At]. 699 (1896), was resolved on the basis of
proximate cause. The difference in approach by the court is due, in no small part,
to the holding in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928),
where Judge Cardozo defined the scope of the duty owed by defendant as com-
mensurate with the orbit of the risk his conduct has created. It is submitted that this
is a more realistic and preferable technique for handling most of the problems hitherto
dealt with under the aegis of proximate cause. See, e.g., Zilka v. Sanctis Constr., Inc.,
409 Pa. 396, 186 A.2d 897 (1962); Helm v. South Penn Oil Co., 382 Pa. 437, 114
A.2d 909 (1955) ; Jowett v. Pennsylvania Power Co., 383 Pa. 330, 118 A.2d 452 (1955) ;
Rockey v. Ernest, 367 Pa. 538, 80 A.2d 783 (1951) ; Leoni v. Reinhard, 327 Pa. 391,
194 Atl. 490 (1937).
26. Diakolios v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 387 Pa. 184, 127 A.2d 603 (1956) (a fall
down escalator brought about by slipping on banana peel while attempting to avoid
grease spot); Churbuck v. Union Ry., 380 Pa. 181, 110 A.2d 210 (1955) (plaintiff
was hit by steel sliver caused by defendant's servant striking rail with pick axe);
Vereb v. Markowitz, 379 Pa. 344, 108 A.2d 774 (1954) (deceased was hit by one car
and propelled into path of another whose driver was violating speed- limit).
27. Menarde v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 376 Pa. 497, 103 A.2d 681 (1954)
(cancer developed from injury sustained when a street car prematurely started as
plaintiff was getting off).
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discussion when the court is weighing the effect of intervening causes on
the extent of defendant's liability.28 Worthy of note also, is the fact that
since the Dahlstrom case, the court has shown a tendency to extend defen-
dant's liability to those consequences which proceed in the nature of events
from his negligent conduct.29 In this respect the court has aligned itself
with the holding in the English case of In re Polemis0 where the defen-
dant was held responsible for the entire damage that resulted when a
negligently dropped plank ignited benzine vapors which were present in
the hold of a ship. Although the dropping of the plank was negligent,
the worst result that could have been foreseen was that it would strike a
ship's hand. But the Court of Appeal was of the opinion that since the
defendant's servant created the risk of injuring the ship itself, liability
extended to all the direct consequences of the conduct.
There is an element of paradox here. True, Pennsylvania has been
faithful to the spirit of the Palsgraf31 rule that duty hinges on the question
of whether defendant ought to have foreseen a risk of harm to plaintiff. But
Pennsylvania apparently did not, as did Judge Cardozo in Palsgraf, assume
that the Polemis rule was in vogue. Instead, in measuring the extent to
which defendant was liable for the harm his breach of duty had caused, the
court again used the notion of foreseeability. Interestingly enough, just at
the time Pennsylvania has reverted to the Polemis rule, the English courts
have switched to the foreseeability test.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not, however, entirely elimi-
nated the possibility of a cut-off point for financial responsibility, and
in 1954 the hindsight test of the Restatement of Torts section 435(2)32
was utilized. In Roadman v. Bellone33 plaintiff was injured when, after
colliding with a police car, his vehicle came in contact with a utility pole
causing a transformer to fall on him. A compulsory non-suit in favor of
the electric company was entered. The plaintiff appealed raising the
question of whether, assuming the electric company was negligent in the
maintenance of the transformer, that negligence was the proximate cause
of his injury. The court discussed the rules applicable to intervening causes
and then cited section 435(2) to the effect that an actor's conduct is not
the legal cause of harm where, after the event and looking back from the
28. This topic is discussed more fully in section IV infra.
29. E.g., Coyne v. Pittsburgh Ry., 393 Pa. 326, 141 A.2d 830 (1958). Plaintiff
was injured when she was struck by a car after being let off defendant's trolley a
distance of ninety feet from the regular stop. Defendant denied its negligence, but
argued that even if it were negligent, such untoward conduct was not the proximate
cause of plaintiff's injury. The court held that the accident was a natural and con-
tinuous sequence unbroken by any superseding cause. Accord, Baer v. Hemlinger, 412
Pa. 406, 194 A.2d 893 (1963) ; Thornton v. Weaber, 380 Pa. 590, 112 A.2d 344 (1955).
30. [1921] 3 K.B. 560 (C.A.). But see Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts
Dock & Engineering Co. Ltd. (The Wagon Mound), [19611 A.C. 388, where the
liability of defendant was extended only to that interest to which its conduct had
created a risk. While the Polemis case was not expressly overruled its rationale was
placed in question. The House of Lords subsequently accepted the foreseeability test
of Wagon Mound in the case of Hughes v. Lord Advocate, [1963] 1 All E.R. 705.
31. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
32. RESTAT4MWNT, TORTs (1948 Supp.).
33. 379 Pa. 483, 108 A.2d 754 (1954).
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harm to the defendant's conduct, it appears highly extraordinary that it
should have brought about the harm.8 4 In view of all the facts of the case
the court concluded that the manner of maintenance of the transformer on
the pole was not a legal cause of the plaintiff's injuries. One is tempted to
question the reasoning of this case in light of the fact that the risk inherent
is not properly securing the transformer to the pole was that some force
applied to the base of the upright would shake the object loose and injure
someone below. 35 Even the application of the foreseeability test would
point in the direction of liability on these facts and as will be seen in the
following section, the negligence of the driver of the police car would
not per se insulate the defendant from liability.
V.
INTERVENING AND SUPERSEDING CAUSES
In the normal course of events, man does not act in a vacuum, but
upon a stage set with any number of conditions and forces all of which are
influenced by, and combine with, his conduct to bring about a given result.
To a particular segment of these forces, namely those which follow the
negligence of defendant in point of time, the law ascribes the label inter-
vening cause. Whether such a force will have the effect of superseding
the actor's wrongful conduct, thus insulating him from liability, is another
facet of the proximate cause concept. Here again the question has nothing
to do with cause in fact which must first be established, but involves policy
considerations dealing with the extent of liability for negligence already
found to exist. Viewing the question in this light, it becomes clear that
the issue of proximate cause should not be raised in the area of intervening
cause until the negligence of the defendant has first been dealt with. Given
this formula, the result in cases similar to Shimer v. Bangor Gas Co.3 "6
becomes readily predictable. In that case the plaintiff sought recovery for
property damage to a house which was demolished as the result of a gas
explosion. The action was brought against a construction company alleging
negligence on its part in breaking a gas pipe that led to houses on the street.
Also joined as defendant was the utility company whose gas inspector
had detonated the explosive substance by negligently striking a match in
the gas filled cellar of the house next to plaintiff's. The construction com-
pany argued that even if it were negligent in breaking the main, this act
of negligence spent itself with that untoward happening, and it was not
responsible for what the preoccupied employee of the gas company did
34. See PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 256-66, where it is suggested that since
virtually all consequences would appear as proceeding in the nature of events to one
endowed with hindsight, those results which are deemed to be extraordinary will be
such that would be unforeseeable at the time the act was performed.
35. See Mars v. Meadville Tel. Co., 344 Pa. 29, 23 A.2d 856 (1942), where the
force causing a utility pole to topple was supplied by a cow brushing up against it.
The court held that since the defendant had created a condition which in the ordinary
course of events would prove injurious to those in the path of the pole were it to be
felled by some outside force, it was only natural and probable to expect that that
force would be applied. The fact that the force was in the form of an animal was
of no significant consequence.
36. 410 Pa. 92, 188 A.2d 734 (1963).
[VOL. 9
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when he struck the match. The court refused to accept this argument and
pointed out that the risk that someone or something would ignite the gas
charged atmosphere was precisely within the risk that encompassed defen-
dant's negligence. On these same grounds, the court has denied a dis-
claimer of liability where someone provided a minor with a gun to shoot
cartridges sold to him,37 failed to inspect a negligently constructed high
pressure tank,38 released the brake on a railroad car parked on a siding, 9
and inadvertently backed a truck into negligently exposed high tension
wires.40 While the court has consistently spoken in terms of proximate or
legal cause when dealing with these problems it seems plain that what
was actually involved was an investigation of the risk which gave rise to
negligence in the first place. 41
Slightly removed from this line of cases are those where the court,
while not specifically dealing with the issue of defendant's negligence, has
applied the foreseeability test to determine the effect of an intervening force.
Thus it has been held that a defendant should have anticipated the ordinary
forces of nature such as wind 42 or snow43 and will not be relieved of
liability unless that force is extraordinary in occurrence or magnitude.44
The same treatment has been given to the intervening conduct of
others, be it innocent,45 negligent 46 or criminal 47 in character. On this
37. Mautino v. Piercedale Supply Co., 338 Pa. 435, 13 A.2d 51 (1940).
38. Foley v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Co., 363 Pa. 1, 68 A.2d 517 (1949). The
court cited the Restatement of Torts § 396 as supporting its opinion.
39. Boyle v. Pennsylvania R.R., 403 Pa. 614, 170 A.2d 865 (1961). The Restate-
m1ient of Torts § 447 was cited as stating the rule to be applied. See n.51 infra.
40. Skoda v. West Penn. Power Co., 411 Pa. 323, 191 A.2d 822 (1963).
41. See Hayes Creek Country Club v. Central Penn Quarry Stripping & Constr.
Co., 407 Pa. 464, 181 A.2d 301 (1962) (rain accompanying hurricane caused stream
to back up and wash out a road) ; Topelski v. Universal South Side Autos, Inc.,
407 Pa. 339, 180 A.2d 414 (1962) (buyer drove guaranteed used car sold with defec-
tive brakes) ; Vitali v. Bankers Sec. Corp., 398 Pa. 230, 157 A.2d 633 (1960) (children
injured when their mother used defective stroller provided by management for use
of shoppers) ; Kuhns v. Brugger, 390 Pa. 331, 135 A.2d 395 (1957) (one child shot
another with a loaded revolver left in dresser drawer) ; Stark v. Lehigh Foundries,
Inc., 388 Pa. 1, 130 A.2d 123 (1957) (deceased was electrocuted when crane came in
contact with high tension wires under which boxcars had been spotted) ; Brogan v.
Philadelphia, 346 Pa. 208, 29 A.2d 671 (1943) (plaintiff splashed by lime when
children threw stones into a mortar box located near road) ; Mars v. Meadville Tel.
Co., 344 Pa. 29, 23 A.2d 856 (1942).
42. In Hudson v. Grace, 348 Pa. 175, 34 A.2d 498 (1943), a vent on the top of
defendant's steel mill emitted steam which the wind blew across a bridge reducing
visibility thereon and causing an accident in which plaintiff's decedent met his death.
The court decided that the intervening agency of the wind should have been antici-
pated. Accord, Kimble v. Mackintosh Hemphill Co., 359 Pa. 461, 59 A.2d 68 (1948)(high wind blew off negligently maintained roof which hit decedent).
43. Bowman v. Columbia Tel. Co., 406 Pa. 455, 179 A.2d 197 (1962) (plaintiff
injured when several telephone poles snapped under the weight of snow on the wires).
44. Ibid; Kimble v. Mackintosh Hemphill Co., 359 Pa. 461, 59 A.2d 68 (1948).
45. Polinelli v. Union Supply Co., 403 Pa. 546, 170 A.2d 576 (1961) (workman
bumped plaintiff into negligently maintained register opening in a house she had come
to inspect.)
46. Levine v. Mervis, 373 Pa. 99, 95 A.2d 368 (1953) (inattentive defendant
unable to avoid collision with another driver who had negligently entered center lane) ;
Nathan v. McGinley, 342 Pa. 12, 19 A.2d 917 (1941) (unskilled treatment administered
by surgeon selected with ordinary care) ; Nelson v. Duquesne Light Co., 338 Pa. 37,
12 A.2d 229 (1940) (negligence of driver who ran into utility pole maintained in
the street was not so extraordinary that it became unforeseeable).
47. Anderson v. Bushong Pontiac Co., 404 Pa. 382, 171 A.2d 771 (1961) (plaintiff
injured by teenager who returned to steal a car from which keys had been stolen
two days before).
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point the case of Malitovsky v. Harshaw Chem. Co.4 8 is illustrative.
Plaintiff was injured when acid splashed on him while he was moving a
drum belonging to the defendant chemical company from a common area
shared by him and the codefendant carrier. The drum had been separated
from the rest of the shipment because of the discovery of a tiny pin hole.
It remained on the carrier's loading platform for an extended period of
time after the chemical company had been notified of the defect. An
employee of the carrier subsequently moved the receptacle to the alleyway
and negligently placed it with the hole facing the wall. Desiring to clear
the area, the plaintiff rolled the barrel toward him and sustained con-
siderable injury when the acid gushed forth from the opening which had
been enlarged by the action of the acid on the metal. The chemical company
disclaimed liability for its negligence contending that the wrongful conduct
of the carrier's employee was a superseding cause. The court denied the
validity of this contention, and reaffirmed the rule that the intervening act
of a third'person, negligent itself or done in a negligent manner, does not
inject it as a superseding cause of harm which the defendant's conduct is
a substantial factor in bringing about. The jury was justified in finding that
the defendant could have foreseen the consequences of its negligence. The
fact that it could not anticipate the particular injury to this particular
plaintiff would not absolve it from financial responsibility for the result.
But not every negligent act of a third person is to be anticipated by
the defendant. The case of Hendricks v. Pyramid Motor Freight Corp.,49
decided by the court in 1938, focuses on this proposition. Plaintiff brought
an action for the wrongful death of her husband who was drowned when
the truck in which he was sitting was propelled off the front of a ferry
boat. A tractor trailer had been negligently started by its driver while
in gear. The truck lurched forward and rammed a car which is turn pushed
the deceased's vehicle through the vessel's restraining barriers. Plaintiff
claimed that the employees of the defendant ferry boat company had been
negligent in not placing blocks under the wheels of the car, and also that
the restraining apparatus was not strong enough to withstand the pressure
applied to it. Assuming that the jury could find negligence on the part
of the boat company, the court posed the question of whether the law should
cast responsibility on it along wvith the defendant tractor trailer company.
The answer, it concluded, depended on whether the driver's conduct was
so extraordinary as not to have been reasonably foreseeable, and on these
facts a proper appreciation of the recklessness of the act led it to the decision
that it was. To the same effect is the more recent case of Guca v. Pittsburgh
Ry.50 where a city gave inadequate warning of a pavement discontinuance
as a result of which deceased's car became stuck on a set of trolley tracks.
It was held that the city was not bound to foresee the extraordinary
48. 360 Pa. 279, 61 A.2d 846 (1948).
49. 328 Pa. 570, 195 Atd. 907 (1938).
50. 367 Pa. 579, 80 A.2d 779 (1951).
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negligence of the trolley driver who failed to notice the deceased who
was attempting to flag him down.
It is interesting to note that the cases setting forth the "extraordinary
negligence" test have made increasing reference to the Restatement of
Torts section 44751 in the course of discussing superseding cause. In
view of that section's liberal treatment of the conduct of others which should
be anticipated by defendant, it would appear that no difference in the extent
of liability exists between the cases involving intervening causes and those
where the manner of occurrence or the extent of damages is at issue. Such
a conclusion would seem to be inevitable were it not for the rather unique
doctrine developed by the cases in the following section.
VI.
SHIFTED RESPONSIBILITY
The case of Kline v. Moyer & Albert52 which came before the court
in 1937, was a personal injuries action in which the plaintiff joined as
defendants both the driver of a truck who left his vehicle standing upon
the highway, and another driver who negligently pulled out from behind
the truck and ran head on into the car in which plaintiff was a passenger.
The jury returned a verdict against both defendants, but a judgment n.o.v.
was entered for the truck driver even though his act of leaving the truck
on the roadway violated a statute. On appeal, the court assumed that the
truck driver was negligent and framed the following issue: whether such
wrongful conduct should be considered a proximate cause of the injury or
as having been superseded by the negligence of his codefendant, thereby
insulating him from liability. To guide the jury on remand it set forth the
test to be applied. In effect they were to determine whether the second
actor had become aware of the potential hazard created by the negligence
of the first, and with that knowledge had performed an independent act of
negligence thereby reducing the prior negligence to the status of a mere
condition, rendering it a remote rather than proximate cause of the injury.
On the other hand, if the jury should find that the subsequent wrongdoer
51. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 447 (1934):
The fact that an intervening act of a third person is negligent in itself or
is done in a negligent manner does not make it a superseding cause of harm to
another which the actor's negligent conduct is a substantial factor in bringing
about, if
(a) the actor at the time of his negligent conduct should have realized that a
third person might so act, or
(b) a reasonable man knowing the situation existing when the act of the
third person was done would not regard it as highly extraordinary that
the third person had so acted, or
(c) the intervening act is a normal response to a situation created by the actor's
conduct and the manner in which it is done is not extraordinarily negligent.
52. 325 Pa. 357, 191 Atl. 43 (1937).
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did not become aware of the situation until his own negligence, when
combined with that of the original tortfeasor, made the accident inevitable
then both would be concurrent causes rendering them jointly and severally
liable for the injuries sustained.53
From the foregoing it becomes clear that if the alleged negligence of
the second actor was his failure to perceive the dangerous condition which
existed, then the negligence of the original wrongdoer will not be super-
seded. Such an observation is borne out by the case of Rodgers v. Yellow
Cab Co.54 Plaintiff was injured when the wheels of the cab in which she
was riding dropped into an excavation which had been dug by one defen-
dant for another. The driver of the cab was also made a defendant, and a
verdict was returned against all three. On appeal the court was of the opinion
that the jury could find that the driver had been inattentive and therefore
negligent, but that such a finding would preclude the conclusion that the
negligence of the cab driver had superseded that of his codefendants.55
While the test set forth in the Kline5 6 case is ostensibly one for the
jury to apply,57 the court has not been adverse to substitute its judgment
for that of the fact-finding body when the facts are not in dispute. For the
most part such action has had the effect of declaring a number of causes
to be concurrent ones, 8 but on one occasion the outcome of this appellate
second guessing resulted in denying recovery to a claimant who appeared
clearly entitled to recover for her damages. In Listino v. Union Paving
Co.,59 plaintiff sustained injuries when the car in which she was riding
swerved from one side of a roadway into the opposite lane of traffic and
was hit broadside by an oncoming vehicle. The accident took place at
night, and the defendant who was in the course of repairing the highway
had failed to give any notice whatsoever of the discontinuance of that
portion of the pavement on which plaintiff's husband had been proceeding.
Evidence was introduced to the effect that the driver had to fight the wheel
53. Id. at 364, 191 Atl. at 46.
54. 395 Pa. 412, 147 A.2d 611 (1959).
55. "[S]ince the cab driver's negligence is predicated upon his failure to use due
care under the circumstances to observe the defect, it would be impossible to conclude
that at the same time he had definite knowledge of this identical condition." Id. at 419,
147 A.2d at 615.
56. 325 Pa. 357, 191 Atl. 43 (1937).
57. Thus, the jury was instructed to apply the test set forth in the Kline case in:
Jeloszewski v. Sloan, 375 Pa. 360, 100 A.2d 480 (1953) (C ran into the cars of A
and B after A had caused an accident) ; Coleman v. Dahl, 371 Pa. 639, 92 A.2d 678(1952) (passenger in B's car was injured when B negligently ran into A's train parked
at crossing in violation of a statute) ; Bricker v. Gardner, 355 Pa. 35, 48 A.2d 209(1946) (passenger in B's truck injured when B negligently collided with A's truck
which was in no parking zone) ; Biehl v. Rafferty, 349 Pa. 493, 37 A.2d 729 (1944)(C killed when hit by B while standing behind A's bus whose driver had not given
statutory warning) ; see also Brazel v. Buchanan, 404 Pa. 188, 171 A.2d 151 (1961). In
Martin v. Arnold, 366 Pa. 128, 77 A.2d 99 (1950), the court held that the granting of a
new trial to a defendant who had been found concurrently negligent was an abuse of dis-
cretion. Accord, Baer v. Hemlinger, 412 Pa. 406,' 194 A.2d 893 (1963) (by implication).
58. Chadwick v. Popadick, 390 Pa. 511, 136 A.2d 87 (1957); St. John v. Kepler,
360 Pa. 528, 61 A.2d 875 (1948); Tolomeo v. Harmony Short Line Motor Transp.
Co., 349 Pa. 420, 37 A.2d 511 (1944) ; Schliele v. Motor Freight Express, Inc.,
348 Pa. 525, 36 A.2d 467 (1944).
59. 386 Pa. 32, 124 A.2d 83 (1956).
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for a distance of thirty feet while the car encountered a series of muddy
ruts and that when he finally regained a position on the paved portion of
the road the car made a 270 foot arc into the opposite lane.60 The jury
returned a verdict for the plaintiff, but on appeal it was held that the
conduct of the husband was a superseding cause rendering defendant's
negligence merely a condition and thus relieving it from liability.61 The
Kline case was cited as controlling the result although, as the dissent filed
by Justice Musmanno clearly points out, the majority had completely mis-
applied the test set forth in that case and had therefore overturned a
proper verdict for plaintiff.
Adding to the semantic confusion that exists in this area of the law
are those cases where the court has attributed to the conduct of the plaintiff
himself the language applicable to superseding causes.6 2 While contributory
negligence can usually be technically justified as falling within the scope of
the language set forth in the Kline case, it is submitted that the policy
reasons for saying that an independent negligent act of a third person
reduces the prior negligence of defendant to a mere condition should not
be intermixed with those cases which deny recovery to the plaintiff when
he himself has contributed to his own injury by some untoward conduct.
The doctrine of shifted responsibility is itself not entirely free from
criticism and disfavor would especially seem appropriate in those cases
where the second actor would be relieved from liability on some other
grounds, or where his deviation from the standard of care is slight in
comparison to that of the original tortfeasor. While the immunity is not as
all pervasive as the formerly accepted "last human wrongdoer" rule,6 3
which placed complete liability on the last wrongdoer in point of time, it
does have the same harsh effect in the instances where it is applicable.
VII.
CONCLUSION
The term proximate or legal cause defies exact definition and is
perhaps best explained as the cut-off point of a wrongdoer's liability for
60. Id. at 35, 124 A.2d at 84.
61. For other applications of the Kline test which have had the effect of relieving
the first wongdoer from liability see Clark v. Morrison, 406 Pa. 130, 177 A.2d 96(1962) ; Bohner v. Eastern Express, Inc., 405 Pa. 463, 175 A.2d 864 (1961) ; Kite v.
Jones, 389 Pa. 339, 132 A.2d 683 (1957) ; Steele v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 386 Pa.
439, 127 A.2d 96 (1956); Ashworth v. Hannum, 347 Pa. 393, 32 A.2d 407 (1943):
Dominices v. Monongahela R.R., 328 Pa. 203, 195 Atl. 747 (1938); Maguire v.
Daughty, 326 Pa. 122, 191 Atl. 348 (1937).
62. In De Luca v. Manchester Laundry & Dry Cleaning Co., 380 Pa. 484, 112A.2d 372 (1955), defendant's truck was parked across a sidewalk of a one way street.
Plaintiff, who was walking along the sidewalk, saw the truck blocking her way and
was hit by another vehicle when she attempted to avoid the obstruction by entering
the street. The court held that even assuming the defendant to be negligent, the con-
duct of plaintiff herself was a superseding cause. Accord, Zlates v. Nasim, 340 Pa.
157, 16 A.2d 381 (1940) ; Dooley v. Charleroi Borough, 328 Pa. 57, 195 At. 6 (1937).
63. Stone v. City of Philadelphia, 302 Pa. 340, 153 At. 550 (1931). This test
has since been modified by the Kline case and those cases where the Kline test has
been applied.
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his negligence which has in fact caused injury to another. Keeping this
description in mind it becomes evident that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has created much confusion by speaking in terms of proximate cause
when the real question at issue was something quite different. Important
to note also is the fact that the meaning of the term will vary with the
factual situation in which it is applied.. In this respect the court has
repudiated the "natural and probable consequences" formula in favor of
the "direct consequences" test of the Restatement of Torts when the manner
of occurrence or the extent of injuries is under consideration. In those
cases where some other force has intervened between the negligence of
defendant and the harm suffered by plaintiff, the court has continued to
apply the foreseeability test, but has shown a tendency to accept the
Restatement of Torts' very liberal definition of what forces and conduct
should be anticipated by a defendant. For these he is held accountable
except where they appear so extraordinary as to be termed unforeseeable,
or where a second wrongdoer, after becoming aware of the hazardous
situation created by the defendant's negligence, has nevertheless by his
independent act of negligence brought about the injury to plaintiff.
The trend toward liberality on the scope of liability for wrongful
conduct would appear to indicate a corresponding benefit to those who are
injured through the conduct of others. It should be remembered, however,
that the court has shown an increasing propensity toward the duty tech-
nique, and in all probability it will continue and expand this concept when
treating problems that once were classified as questions of proximate
cause. That is, having repudiated foreseeability as a limitation on liability,
the court has become somewhat reluctant to find any liability at all.
It would appear, therefore, that the court has not settled upon any
overall philosophy as to exactly what the risk principle of the law of
negligence entails, since, quite obviously, the Polemis rule of proximate
causation hardly fits into any well ordered system of risk analysis. Indeed,
to a surprising extent the decided cases represent an affirmance of the
principle that "there are no fixed rules. ' 64 Thus, in the period of twenty-
five years, dealing with the recurring problem of proximate cause, the court
has not seen the forest because of the trees. In this, however, the court
may not be atypical, since even a cursory reading of proximate cause cases
from other jurisdictions indicates similar situations prevail generally. Since
it cannot be assumed that the overwhelming number of American state
courts suffer from intellectual failings, it would appear that the courts
deliberately have refrained from systemizing the risk principle along the
lines currently in vogue in England. Instead, Pennsylvania, like many other
courts, has !adopted as a working principle that the question is one of
"common sense," 65 "fair judgment" 66 or, even "expediency. '67 It may
64. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 355, 162 N.E. 99, 104 (1928)
(Andrews' dissent).
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid.
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